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Abstract 
 
Our online interaction with information-systems may well provide the largest arena of formal 
logical reasoning in the world today. Presented here is a critique of the foundations of Logic, in 
which the metaphysical assumptions underlying traditional logic are contrasted with those of such 
'closed world' reasoning. Closed worlds mostly employ a syntactic alternative to formal language 
namely, recording data in files. Whilst this may be unfamiliar as logical syntax, it is argued here 
that propositions are expressed by data stored in files which are essentially non-linguistic and so 
cannot be expressed by simple formulae F(a), with the inference-rules normally used in Logic. 
Hence, the syntax of data may be said to define a fundamentally new kind of logical form for 
simple propositions.  In this way, the logic of closed systems is shown to be non-classical, 
differing from traditional logic in its truth-conditions, inferences and metaphysics.  This paper 
will be concerned mainly with how the reference and certain inferences in such a closed system 
differ metaphysically from classical logic. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Closed information-systems employ a common 'closed world' logic which is just as 
universal as classical logic but differs significantly from it in terms of reference, truth and 
inference. Yet our use of these systems provides what is arguably the largest arena of 
formal logical reasoning in the world today. Such systems include hospitals, government 
departments, warehouses, airports, universities. As an example of the different logic 
being used, consider that if 'Jones' was not listed in the passenger manifest for a flight, we 
are entitled to logically infer that Jones was not on that flight. But in classical logic 
however, from the mere absence of a proposition, no proposition whatsoever can be 
inferred. The manifest describes a closed world, and no passenger is allowed to exist 
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outside the manifest. In other words, by the logic of closed systems, the world description 
provided by the passenger manifest is required to be complete. The fundamental 
metaphysical implications of this closed world logic that are presented here have been 
largely overlooked by philosophers, despite the global impact of such systems. The 
present paper will examine this metaphysics regarding mainly the referential and certain 
inferential differences; a future paper will analyse the metaphysics of the different truth-
conditions implicit in this kind of discourse. 
 
The simplest propositions employed in such logical discourse are normally formalised as 
data stored in files. These are treated as a closed system in the sense that the system 
ontology is presumed to be completely listed within the files; this assumption is called 
domain closure. To explore the metaphysics of such discourse, we adopt the terminology 
of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in which the world was described as a totality of facts. If we 
apply this to a local world as given by files, then notationally, the syntax of the files is 
treated as a boundary to whatever exists within the system; anything not recorded by the 
files is said to be 'outside the system' and not within the universe of discourse. No such 
syntactic device was available to Wittgenstein however, in the Frege/Russell formalism 
that he used in the Tractatus to express the totality of facts. By imposing domain closure, 
such logical syntax can nevertheless now be seen to have great practical significance.  
 
The users of such a closed system form a speech community, and it is the deductive 
inferences permitted by this speech that we shall here demonstrate to possess a non-
classical logic. In a future paper, the truth-conditions of this speech will be found to also 
require a non-Tarski semantics. Here however, the focus will be on reference, and unlike 
the referring use of names, definite or indefinite descriptions, demonstratives or 
indexicals familiar from Fregean logic, it will be shown rather, that in the logic being 
studied here, objects are referred to anonymously, and that this is a new kind of reference 
which, as far as I am aware, has not previously been identified by philosophers. 
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Likewise when no record is stored ascribing a simple predicate G to an object, the user of 
a closed system is logically entitled to infer that G is not true of that object; this logical 
inference is called the closed world assumption. Classical logic however, assumes an 
open world since it is based upon the interpretation of linguistic formulae, formalising 
various sentences of natural language. And in this classical logic of sentences, the mere 
absence of a simple predicate G in a set of sentences believed to be true of an object does 
not in itself entitle one to infer anything about whether G is true or false of the object. 
Consequently, a file of records is unlike a set of sentences, since the deductive inferences 
possible from a file of data differ from those possible from a set of axioms. Yet despite 
our lives being dominated by such reasoning from data, it has been largely overlooked by 
philosophers as a valid mode of logical inference, in favour of reasoning from sentences. 
 
This series of papers undertakes to systematically compare and contrast the propositional 
content of these two kinds of world-description: the nonlinguistic data in files, versus the 
linguistic formulae F(a) of traditional logic. This difference in content is revealed by their 
different truth-conditions and modes of logical inference, together with their differing 
metaphysical implications. The argument will be structured with reference to how the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein developed. For it is suggested here that Wittgenstein was 
motivated by similar considerations concerning the limits of expression within different 
symbolic systems. We consider in particular, how easily numerical propositions can be 
expressed in the logic of a closed world, in the light of Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with 
the complexity of their expression by classical logic. The subsequent syntactic 
development of Wittgenstein's thoughts on numerical expression, starting with the logic 
of The Tractatus, through his criticism of this logic in his middle period, to the 
Philosophical Investigations are all fruitfully tracked here from the unexpected 
perspective of domain closure and related considerations. 
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We begin by considering what Wittgenstein himself required of a logical notation; firstly, 
in describing totalities of facts and numbers of objects, and secondly in expressing what I 
call their ‘anonymity’.  
 
To demonstrate how data in files are suited to meet these requirements, I break down the 
syntax of files into their primitive elements. Examining, in their simplest form, the 
underlying syntactic principles distinguishing the reference performed by data from 
reference by formal sentences, then enables the syntax of files to be viewed as a 
rudimentary kind of logical form. It is found that the primitive syntactic elements of files 
may then be adjudged as providing revised logical categories. For, just as variables, 
argument-places and quantifiers helped formalise earlier metaphysical ideas of substance, 
attributes, existence etc, so I show how the same may now be said of records, files, data-
values. More specifically, the two above-mentioned issues that the logical calculus of 
Frege and Russell, made problematic for Wittgenstein, are now resolved if elementary 
propositions in a world description are conceived non-linguistically, as data in files. 
 
My reason for proposing to treat the syntax of tabular data as a logical form for 
propositions, is that there are truth-conditions needed by closed systems and provided by 
physical operations on the syntax of data, which cannot be provided by physical 
operations on the syntax of simple formal sentences. And yet every logical operation 
performable on sentences of a formal language can also be performed equivalently, upon 
data in files. The additional truth-conditions to be discussed here are the two previously 
mentioned referential characteristics, totality and anonymity, that I believe serve to 
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distinguish data fundamentally from formal sentences. As a result, we may be entitled to 
say that for many elementary or non truth-functional propositions describing closed 
systems the syntax of data provides a better logical form than the syntax of formal 
sentences. To now specify these two referential characteristics further, we introduce each 
of them in the context in which it was first encountered by Wittgenstein, as follows. 
 
Firstly, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was very concerned, in a manner not unlike a 
modern database designer, with the logical possibility of giving a complete description of 
the world. At 4.26 he said that the world can be completely described by giving all true 
and false elementary propositions: 
4.26   If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete 
          description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all  
          elementary propositions and adding which of them are true and which false.  
I shall argue that, for this to be the case then, by elementary propositions, Wittgenstein 
cannot just have meant interpreted simple (non truth-functional) sentences F(a), in the 
notation of Frege and Russell. For, since the simple singular terms a,b, ... in such 
sentences refer independently of one another, they cannot jointly ensure that all objects in 
the world have been described. Rather, such global reference was intended by 
Wittgenstein separately. Without this additional constraint, no universal or numerical 
facts about even a finite world can be deduced from the elementary sentences alone, and 
so such elementary propositions cannot be guaranteed to describe the world completely.  
 
In this way, it is confirmed that Wittgenstein meant more by elementary propositions than 
just simple sentences, as ordinarily interpreted. I then argue the case for the non-linguistic 
 6 
symbolism of stored data, used nowadays for this very purpose of world description. 
Files of data can be seen as systems of elementary propositions precisely meeting 
Wittgenstein’s requirement, at least for a particular domain. In keeping with T4.26, files 
of data have the advantage that they impose the above referential constraint (domain 
closure) automatically, ie as part of their own interpretation. For a particular domain, it is 
clear that, unlike Fregean sentences, this enables elementary propositions (data) to 
express (Tr 3.01) ‘all that is the case’. As well as all universal facts, this also includes all 
numerical facts since, when enumerating objects, we always assume we are counting 
their totality.    
 
The second referential characteristic, anonymity, of files of data, was encountered by 
Wittgenstein in a purely numerical context. For, to know the number three of say, green 
apples, need not be to know which apples are green. It seems that to know the number of 
green apples, these apples do not need to be individually identified and can be 
anonymous. This was expressed linguistically by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus [spelled 
out eg in 1932]
1
 by means of variables, using quantifiers, to say that the green apples can 
be assigned one-one to x1, x2, x3 respectively, in such a way that there are no green 
apples left over, to assign to x4, where none of these apples need be named. However, in 
1932 he expressed dissatisfaction with this quantificational account of number, as 
misrepresenting our actual use of numerals in counting. I shall argue that a formalisation 
of records in a file enables the same anonymity to be logically expressed for numerals, 
but avoiding, as Wittgenstein seemed to require, the apparently unnatural use of variables 
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or quantifiers. And so the truths of Arithmetic will be deducible simply and naturally 
from Logic, once we allow files of data as a new non-classical form of logic. 
Metaphysically, I aim to show that, whereas in his former definition of number the 
imposed use of a formal logical language required us to assume that, ‘To be is to be the 
value of a bound variable’ [Quine2 , Tractatus 4.1272], the propositions in a database 
require us to assume only, that to be, is to be recorded in a file without necessarily being 
identified by name
3
. Like the bound variable, this may be said to grant expression, by 
means of a formal symbolism, to the metaphysical idea of substance. More generally, 
when the very concept of a file of data is analysed into its primitive syntactic elements, 
these elements will sometimes be found to possess a logical significance conforming 
more closely with traditional metaphysical categories, than do the corresponding 
syntactic categories of modern Logic. 
 
We now explore each of these linguistic/non-linguistic issues: totality, anonymity, in 
greater detail. The approach will be to start by examining each of these criteria of truth 
and reference with respect to only the most elementary constituents of which files are 
built. We will then gradually combine the semantic effects of these syntactic elements, 
arriving only at the end, at the full philosophical idea of records in a file. 
 
2.  Totalities of Facts 
At Tractatus 1 Wittgenstein famously said ‘the world is everything that is the case’, from 
which we may infer that if the list of elementary propositions at T4.26 ‘describes the 
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world completely’ it must describe every fact about the objects in the world. However, if 
propositions are interpreted sentences of a formalised object language, ie interpreted 
logical forms, where the elementary propositions are those that are not truth-functions of 
other propositions, then many facts about the world cannot be described by such a list.  
 
Consider a concrete example: let a local world be given by some family-tree. Then the 
corresponding propositions describe all the family relationships ie truth-functions of the 
parent-child relation, together with male, female gender predicates.  Let the elementary 
propositions be expressed therefore, by sentences of the form: a is a parent of b, a is 
male, b is female. Then no set of such sentences can describe the family completely, for 
consider a male parent John whose only children are James and William, then the world 
description would contain the sentences John is a parent of James, John is a parent of 
William, John is male, James is male, William is male. Now our inferences about this 
family cannot be given by these sentences alone because we are also entitled to infer in 
this world that William has no sisters, but this fact is not deducible from any of these 
sentences, or even all of them. It is a universal proposition depending on John having no 
daughters, but nothing in these sentences tells us that John has no daughters, only that, if 
he has daughters, then they are not listed here. In short, we have no way of knowing that 
the list is complete, that it describes the totality of facts.  
 
However epistemically, if we consider William’s knowledge, we do find it is complete, 
since he clearly knows he has no sisters. Thus William’s knowledge is not adequately 
expressed by the list of sentences. We might say William’s knowledge more resembles a 
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mental model, than a mental list of sentences
4
. Nor could the linguistic deficiency be 
remedied by adding (elementary) sentences to the list, for none of these can tell us that 
the list is complete, ie that what is missing from the list does not exist. We seem to have 
identified a deficiency in the descriptive power of formal languages, due to each simple 
singular term in the sentences referring independently of the others. However, like a 
mental model, it seems clear also that Wittgenstein at T4.26 fully intended his elementary 
propositions to refer to every object in the world, and not to succumb to this deficiency of 
formal languages.  
 
Contrast the set of sentences with the case of the family-tree. The family-tree correctly 
allows us to infer, not only that James and William are both sons of John, but also that 
John has no other children. For what is absent from the tree is treated as nonexistent, and 
since in the tree daughters are absent from John. In this (closed world logic) we can 
validly infer from the tree that John has no daughters. Epistemically the tree also 
adequately expresses William’s knowledge, where the list of sentences does not. William 
really knows the totality of facts about this limited world, and the tree meets a local 
version of Wittgenstein’s requirement that ‘a complete description of the world’ (T4.26) 
should entail ‘everything that is the case’ (T1) and that it should assert ‘the totality of 
facts’ (T1.1). But it seems to depend on the representation being a model rather than a 
linguistic description. In other words, elementary logical forms in the Frege/Russell 
notation are unable fully to express William’s knowledge. It does indeed seem as if 
Wittgenstein was describing the logic of what we would now call a closed world. 
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We see that, apart from the Tractatus requirement at 4.26 that the truth/falsity of all 
possible such sentences should be listed, there was also the requirement that the 
description be known to be complete, ie refer to all the objects in the world. However, the 
description need not be a formal structure such as a tree, in order to achieve this. For 
consider another example: the register for a class at a school. The assertion, deduced from 
the register, that every child is present, is not simply inferred from the equivalent list  
Anne is present, Bob is present, …  etc for this is only the case if the register lists all the 
children, and nothing in the register, viewed as a list of sentences, tells us this is so. So 
the register can only be interpreted as a set of sentences if these are understood under the 
additional semantic condition that their totality refers to every child in the class, ie that 
the sentences are jointly to be treated as a model or picture of the world. I shall show that 
what really satisfies Wittgenstein’s requirement is something that is neither a formal 
model nor a set of formal sentences, but a propositional sign that subtly combines the two 
namely, a formal file or database. 
 
A formal model like the family-tree employs a one-one correspondence between simple 
elements (nodes) in the world-description and objects in the world. Formal databases 
however, seem to be models which also express propositions –by allowing their logical 
structure to be provided by formal symbols alone. Indeed, Wittgenstein said at T3.01 that 
the totality of true thoughts (ie the world-description) must itself be a picture (or model) 
of the world. Yet we have seen that the requisite one-one correspondence with objects 
entails that the set of such thoughts cannot be expressed just by interpreting the syntax of 
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Fregean sentences. Rather, the formal structure of a picture or model might lead us to a 
new syntax for thoughts, namely as formal data in a file. 
  
Only with the additional rule that every child in the class is referred to by its name in 
some sentence (domain-closure) does the set of sentences in the register entail 
‘everything that is the case’, as I understand Wittgenstein to have required, since only 
then can we be sure there is a one-one correspondence set up between the children and 
the names. But this rule is not a linguistic rule, it is not a condition for the truth of 
individual sentences, rather it is a condition for a world description to be complete. It 
means that when all the individual elementary sentences (axioms) are listed according to 
Wittgenstein’s requirements at T4.26,  an additional condition for a world-description 
(and hence for T4.26 itself) to be true is that to every object in the domain there must be a 
simple singular term in some sentence, which refers to that object. This condition 
evidently cannot be expressed in the object language, but is a rule for its interpretation. 
However, in a database the same condition is expressed by a syntactic part of the object-
notation itself, viz: by the boundaries of the files. 
 
By referring at T4.26 to ‘all elementary propositions’ Wittgenstein was requiring that 
every object has been named; in doing this he was making an additional stipulation that 
was not an ordinary truth-condition of the particular language of logical forms due to 
Frege and Russell, and used by the Tractatus. However, without this assumption of 
domain-closure, such a putative world-description cannot entail any universal 
generalisations since it is possible for the domain to contain unnamed objects which do 
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not fit the generalisation. It is because of this that from singular propositions, universal 
propositions cannot normally be deductively inferred.  
 
Wittgenstein never defined elementary propositions exactly
5
, but domain-closure does 
appear to have the significant consequence that no set of Fregean formulae is capable, at 
least on the standard interpretation, of fully expressing what he meant by elementary 
propositions. It seems, to make T4.26 true, that a suitable formalism for elementary 
propositions would need to incorporate some version of domain-closure into its standard 
truth-conditions. However, not only in the two examples above but in files generally, the 
data do normally meet this requirement, for this is the meaning of enclosing the data 
within a tabular boundary.   
 
 3.  Arithmetic and Logic 
As well as universal propositions, ‘Everything that is the case’ also includes numerical 
propositions, and so T4.26 would seem to also require numerical propositions about the 
world to be entailed by the elementary propositions. However, we shall see that this is not 
possible for Fregean sentences, because numerical propositions also assume domain 
closure. Thus, when counting objects, e.g. apple-1, apple-2, … we naturally assume that 
when we finish counting we will have described the totality of apples. But because of the 
possible lack of domain-closure, this assumption cannot be made about any Fregean 
world-description, and numerical quantity cannot be deduced from elementary sentences 
alone. However, this is not a problem for files, and I show how, in this case, numerical 
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quantity can be deduced from elementary propositions, if elementary propositions are 
viewed as data in a file.  
 
In the absence of domain-closure for sentences, the Tractatus [T4.1272], instead of 
naming every object, resorted to bound variables. However, while still accepting that 
arithmetic is fully expressible in Logic, Wittgenstein came to feel nevertheless [1932]
6
 
that this use of bound variables misrepresents our use of numerals (although not their 
truth-conditions). As a proposed solution, I develop the view that we may regard files of 
data as propositional signs referring by the same principle of one-one correspondence as 
used in counting objects. By then deriving numerical statements more naturally from 
such ‘elementary propositions’, we aim to also explain Wittgenstein’s misgivings about 
the use of quantifiers to express arithmetic by means of Fregean logic.  
 
To this end, we first examine Wittgenstein’s early account in the Tractatus endorsing a 
quantificational definition of number. At T4.1272  he expressed the view that ‘There are 
two objects which …’ is expressed by ‘(x,y) …’ The full formula may be found in 
[1932]
7, where however Wittgenstein now says of Frege’s functional notation that it is 
queer ‘that we never use it when we are asked to reckon how many apples we have’. 
Rather, we prefer to use the familiar language of one-one correspondence with numerals. 
 
In nevertheless accepting the unity of arithmetic and logic, it seems from this comment 
that Wittgenstein still required the number of apples to be a logical consequence of which 
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particular objects are apples, but that this should happen in a natural way, not involving 
complex quantifiers. One way of examining the apparent tension between the relative 
expressive powers for the number of apples of arithmetic and of Fregean logic, might be 
to ask whether, given a world-description, say of particular children in a class, it is 
possible to deduce from the world-description how many children we have
8
, purely by 
logical inference.  
 
This can be seen to be similar to the previous problem about the totality of facts, since the 
number of children also, on the Tractatus analysis, is found to depend upon an implied 
universal quantification whose inference from the class-register would assume all the 
children have been named. To see this, consider the following example, referring to a 
domain of apples. The statement that exactly three apples are green would be written
9
, 
(E3x)G(x)= 
(1)… x1,x2,x3(Gx1&Gx2&Gx3)  &  ~x1,x2,x3,x4(Gx1&Gx2&Gx3&Gx4) 
where the second clause says that in every quadruple of apples, at least one of the apples 
is not green. Wittgenstein implies the main reason we would not write this ‘to reckon 
how many apples we have’ is because it misrepresents how we think. He also notes that it 
still employs the principle of correlation or one-one correspondence used in arithmetic. 
As Wittgenstein  says rather shortly, this expression of arithmetic in Fregean notation 
requires us to correlate the variables of one clause in the formula with the variables in the 
other clause, just as we do in counting objects; a circular definition. We appear to have 
reduced arithmetic only to another version of itself. 
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I shall try to show that the unity between arithmetic and logic is exhibited, not by 
attempting to define arithmetic in a logical notation foreign to it, but rather by altering the 
notation of logic to a form (files of data) more congenial to arithmetic, viz: to one 
employing one-one correspondence itself as a mode of reference in Logic.  
 
Firstly, to establish that (1) cannot be inferred from an elementary world description in 
the Frege/Russell calculus, consider some such description, as perhaps envisaged at 
T4.26, given by the set S of elementary formulae,  
{G(a), G(b), G(c), ~R(a), ~R(b), ~R(c), R(d), R(e), ~G(d), ~G(e) }. Then S can describe 
any domain{a, b, c, d, e, …}containing at least three green and two red, apples. 
Therefore, the above formula (1) stating that there are exactly three green apples cannot 
be deduced from this set of sentences, because, although from G(a), one can infer 
x1G(x1), [and likewise for b, c and x2, x3], there is no way to infer the ~ clause in (1) 
since, in the absence of domain-closure, there may well be some other x in the domain of 
apples which is not named in the set S, and which is green. Hence we cannot logically 
infer the number of green apples from such a set of elementary sentences about apples. In 
other words, the Fregean notation does not allow numerical facts about the world to be 
logically deduced from elementary descriptions of the world alone. 
 
However, the fact that this consequence of elementary world-descriptions is 
counterintuitive seems to show we do tacitly wish
10
 to assume domain-closure for them. 
Since linguistic sentences (axioms) need not satisfy this assumption, we might be led to 
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seek a notation that does, so that our world-description really does entail ‘everything that 
is the case’, including, in particular, all numerical facts. Moreover, if we could indeed 
deduce Number from our logically simple propositions, then our definition of number 
might then be more intuitive than (1). In particular, it may eliminate the awkwardness in 
(1) of requiring certain objects not to exist. 
 
Such a symbolism for propositions may not be inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s belief at 
this time [1932], since it seems clear that this belief was not a commitment to any single 
notation. Rather, it was the general concern that numerical truths must result from the 
fundamental nature of the proposition, and that a correct symbolism for propositions 
would reveal this in a natural way. His problem however, was that the current symbolism 
for propositions appeared not to do this. For, in the terminology of the Tractatus, if 
propositions took a purely linguistic or more specifically, Fregean, form, then the number 
of objects of a certain kind did not follow from the ‘elementary’ propositions about 
objects of that kind.
11
 
 
I plan to show that if elementary propositions are reconstrued as data in a file, then 
numerical propositions do become deducible from elementary propositions in a natural 
way, thus facilitating the expression of Arithmetic in Logic. This is because the data in 
such a file will be found to perform the same kind of referring that we perform when 
counting. 
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4.   Anonymous objects 
Consider counting five apples: apple-1, apple-2, …, apple-5,  Here, ‘the second apple’, or 
‘apple-2’ is certainly a singular term, but it is not a definite description of the apple, nor 
is it a name
12
, but rather it is just a temporary designation by counting. It is clear that if 
the counting is ad hoc, not following any method, then it may later be impossible to infer, 
from the numeral alone, the identity of the apple; the numerals may thus be said to refer 
anonymously. 
 
However, by the anonymity of numerals, we do not mean the kind of anonymous 
reference performed by free or bound variables, since each numeral refers to a particular 
individual. Admittedly, a variable x1 does not identify an object either, and so is 
anonymous, but neither does it refer only to one particular object: it is an indeterminate 
and can refer to any object in the domain. Thus if apples a, b, c are green, then even if 
G(x2) is true of apple b, it is equally the case that G(x2) is true of apples a,c also and, 
unlike the applied numerals ‘apple-1’, ‘apple-2’, ‘apple-3’, ... , there is no particular apple 
exclusively assigned to x2. Rather, we may say the applied numerals are treated as 
constants; thus G(apple-2) is a sentence, having a unique truth-value. Nevertheless these 
constants refer anonymously, because the sign apple-2 may alone be insufficient to 
identify its referent, (unless there was some method to the counting).  
 
Thus, to say that apple-2 is green is to say simply that the apple counted as ‘apple-2’ is 
green. This is a definite description referring not only to apples, but also to the reference 
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(by counting) of a sign; and it is this that constitutes the anonymity of numerals. Hence 
we see that such a proposition is not expressible in any formal object language, but 
requires a metalanguage. It seems that a language must, to enumerate objects, contain 
constants (‘apple-2’) which refer reflexively to ‘the referent of this sign’ under some 
given referring relation, ie implicitly refer to themselves and the relation, as well as to 
objects. This says, they must be constants that refer anonymously.  
  
Thus, applied arithmetic appears to use a novel kind of reference, counting, not available 
to formal object languages. In order to formalise the special propositions of 
enumeration
13
 therefore, we need a formal notation that yields both the one-one reference 
and the anonymity, of numerals. It would be ideal for this purpose to abstract out the 
numerical meaning
14
 from the set of singular terms {‘apple-1’, ..., ‘apple-5’}, leaving 
only their anonymous correspondence with objects. Unfortunately this is not possible, 
since the numerals refer only as part of the very process of counting.  
 
However, there is an ancient non-numerical symbolism that that refers to objects in 
exactly the same way as numerals, namely 
●   ●   ●   ●   ●  
This is the simple symbolism of keeping a tally, whereby an identical dot or mark is 
made for each new object being tallied, without enumerating them. The dot signifies a 
particular object but, like a numeral, does not reveal its identity. This surely must be the 
most ancient and primitive symbolism for depicting objects in general. Nevertheless, the 
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tally operates according to its own strict rules, for it means the dots are to be understood 
as being in exact one-one correspondence with all the objects in the domain, without 
identifying any of these objects. If this is not the case, then the tally was kept improperly. 
It is not possible for the individual dots (like symbols) to identify their referents by their 
own distinctive shapes, as the dots are all indistinguishable. It might be possible for them 
to identify their referents by their position, but equally these positions may be random 
and have no referential significance. Thus the dots or tally-marks refer, but they do so 
anonymously.  
 
If the dots are used to keep a tally of apples, it seems they perform the same purely 
referential function as do the ‘anonymous constants’ ‘apple-1’, ‘apple-2’, ‘apple-3’, ... 
but without the function of ascribing numerical order or quantity. Moreover, they do this 
without being symbols in any language. We now consider whether these dots could 
nevertheless form the basis of a logical notation. Although these dots are not as yet 
singular terms in a propositional sign, and are so far only elements in a tally
15
, let us first 
review the mode of reference by such elements, as compared with the mode of reference 
of variables in logic, where the domain comprises exactly the objects being tallied.  
 
1. Anonymity. Like a variable, each dot refers to a unique unspecified object but, 
unlike a variable, the dot stands for one particular object and, once used, the dot 
cannot be used to refer to any other object. 
                                                          
15
 The tally is not even a model, since no predicates or relationships between the dots is presented, their 
sequence may have no significance. 
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2. One-one. Further, unlike the normal Tarskian variables, different dots must refer 
to different objects.  
3. Domain-closure. And finally, like a bound variable, the dots jointly refer to all the 
objects in the domain.  
 
In other words, the mapping from dots to objects is an anonymous one-one function 
satisfying domain-closure. This is what defines an overall one-one correspondence 
between the dots and the domain. But the big contrast with variables, of course, is that 
each dot is unrepeatable and so cannot be treated as a symbol at all. Nevertheless, each of 
the three conditions remains true of certain symbols, eg if for ‘dot’ we substitute ‘applied 
numeral’ or ‘apple-2’. By contrast, a Tarski assignment of objects to free variables is a 
many-one function from variables into the domain [infringing 2, 3].  
 
Curiously, these three elementary properties seem to counter some of the complaints or 
discomforts experienced by Wittgenstein with Fregean notation. [For example his 
modification of variables to one-one reference, while intended purely to avoid using an 
identity predicate, also makes them conform  to (2), and hence more like tally-marks].   
 
In summary, the dot refers to a particular but unidentified object
16
, and has the kind of 
reference we perform when counting a set of objects. Here we keep track of each object 
counted, ensuring (3) that every object is counted, and (2) that we do not count it again 
[but (1) we need not identify it as an individual]. However, a tally is more basic than 
                                                          
16
 The objects referred to by dots somewhat resemble the medieval scholastic notion of substances as bare 
particulars. This was the metaphysical idea of objects possessing both individuality (essence) and existence 
(substance), but which could not be identified by any (or all) of their properties.  
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counting since I can keep a tally of say, passing cars, or days in prison, without attaching 
any numerals to individual cars or days, ie without recording their order or quantity. 
Tallying is always referential, but not necessarily numerical. 
 
 
 
5.   Data as non-linguistic propositions 
Now the way to make these dots not merely referential, but propositional, is to add 
predicates to our referring-terms. This can be done by the simple expedient of hollowing 
out our dots to provide empty cells: 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○     
And then, by inserting in each cell a symbol to signify a predicate, we can generate a list 
of propositions such as the following, 
G G R G R 
to describe green and red apples. The cells themselves have now been made invisible, and 
need to be imagined; each cell is now a place in which exactly one symbol may be 
written, and is what we formerly regarded as a tally-mark. Thus, for our new kind of 
singular term, the empty cell, I shall argue that we also have a new kind of logically 
simple proposition.  
 
This tally of apples might be called a file, and the elementary propositional signs of 
which it is composed, might be called data. Such a file naturally inherits for its cells, and 
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hence for its data, the three referential properties just listed for tallies, defining 
anonymous one-one correspondence. Unlike a pure model (or picture), a file of data is 
interpreted assertorically, ie it expresses propositions. This is because the data do appear 
to combine singular and general terms, but in a non-linguistic manner.  
 
However, the reference of the singular terms is known only transiently (while tallying), 
and so such a file is not a permanent record, unless symbols are added to identify the 
apples, ie they are no longer anonymous. 
  
While the singular terms are physical tokens (unrepeatable cells), as required for 
arithmetic, the predicates or general terms are abstract types (symbols), as required by 
language. Thus a file of data may be regarded referentially as a model and predicatively 
as linguistic (since the predicates in the file merely denote but do not resemble properties 
of the objects). However, as in a model, the mere absence of a predicate from a cell in 
which it is eligible is sufficient to signify its negation
17
 for that object. Apparently unique 
therefore, among modes of representation, a file seems to be a hybrid both of a physical 
model, and of a linguistic description, combining advantages of both. We may call it, an 
assertoric model
18
. 
 
Of course, the very limited kind of file presented here can express only a restricted range 
of elementary propositions, viz: those referring anonymously, and ascribing only single 
                                                          
17
 Database theorists call this property of files: the Closed World Assumption. 
18
 However, a Relational Model used as a sign (comprising lists instead of sets) cannot count as a file, 
because its singular terms are, not physical objects (cells), but abstract symbols (names) and hence, while 
they achieve domain-closure, they fail to refer anonymously. Thus no relational model can express the 
meaning of the file GGRGR.  
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monadic predicates such as red, green that are mutually exclusive. This is because each 
singular term is not a symbol but a physical place where only one symbol can be written, 
so no two such predicates can be ascribed to the same object at the same time
19
.  
Nevertheless, even such simple tallies can be useful as ‘world’ descriptions, as we shall 
see. 
 
It may be noted that this syntactic convention is the exact opposite of Frege’s convention 
of saturated and unsaturated signs, for here it is the singular term that is unsaturated, and 
the general term that completes it. This is because the cell is interpreted here not as an 
argument-place, but as an object
20, and is consistent with Aristotle’s talk of properties 
‘inhering’ in substances. Here, the logical relation of subject to predicate meant by 
‘inhering’, or ‘informing’, can no longer be regarded with Frege and Russell as linguistic. 
Predication, in this language/model hybrid, is now better expressed as  the occupancy of a 
tabular cell by a symbol.  
 
Moreover, all the singular terms are united in a totality, reminiscent of scholastic talk 
viewing substance as a plastic medium, in which no two impressions can be made in the 
same place. Notice that the notation also accommodates Wittgenstein’s rejection of an 
identity predicate [T5.531] since every cell refers to a different object, and so two cells 
cannot be identified with each other. 
 
                                                          
19
 However, this severe limitation can ultimately be extended to the full generality of a database admitting 
each object into all possible properties and relations. 
20
 However, in complex relational files, some cells do express Fregean argument-places. 
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Such elementary propositions are genuinely new in the sense of being inexpressible in 
Fregean logical form, thus granting at least some of the extra flexibility that the later 
Wittgenstein wanted from language-games. For, not only does domain-closure prevent 
the above file of data being translated into elementary formulae F(a) in Frege’s notation, 
it cannot be translated into any formulae whatsoever in a formalised object-language, 
since the truth-conditions of individual anonymity can only be provided by naming cells 
and the reference relation itself, as well as the objects to which they refer
21
. Data should 
be regarded therefore, as expressing propositions that are, in formal terms, strictly non-
linguistic, and therefore not expressible in classical logic. The logical form of such 
propositions is provided instead by formal symbols occupying cells of records in an 
abstract file. 
 
If cells do indeed provide a new formal mode of reference, not possible in the current 
symbolism of logic, then it would seem that Wittgenstein’s claim,   
T4.1272      ‘Wherever the word ‘object’ (‘thing’ etc) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual 
notation by a variable name.’  
is no longer quite true. Similarly, for Quine’s dictum that ‘To be is to be the value of a 
bound variable’. For we have found that the word ‘object’ can also be expressed by the 
cells in a file, and that this is not logically equivalent to the use of variables. For, while 
neither cells nor variables identify their referents, a cell has only one such referent and, 
like the referent of a bound variable, this may also be described as an 'object'. Thus, 
speaking of a non-empty file, one may indeed say eg ‘There are objects’, contrary to 
T4.1272. Apart from formal language, there are clearly also non-linguistic ways of 
                                                          
21
 But they can, like all truth-conditions, be defined in an informal metalanguage. 
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making precise reference to objects, eg by systematic record-keeping, using files. It 
appears that data in cells conform to a non-linguistic logic, enabling us to describe and 
refer to particular anonymous objects in a new way. And so, perhaps sometimes, 
‘whereof one cannot speak’ (eg ‘objects’), thereof one may be able, nevertheless, to 
meaningfully tabulate. 
  
 
6.   Wittgenstein’s shopkeeper 
We now reconsider how this non-classical symbolism might help us express numerical 
quantity and thereby assist the expression of Arithmetic by pure Logic. In his later work, 
Wittgenstein disregarded his earlier quantificational definition of Number, and instead 
examined the logical nature of enumeration. At §1 in Philosophical Investigations (PI), 
Wittgenstein presents an example where the objects are again apples, in which a 
shopkeeper receives the request “five red apples” from a customer. He responds by 
selecting red apples one at a time from a drawer and pronouncing a numeral for each one, 
until ‘five’ is reached. 
 
In this language-game the apples are never mentioned individually by name; rather, the 
shopkeeper just counts out apples without identifying them individually. Anonymous 
reference is presupposed in this language-game by shopkeeper and customer alike. What 
is this anonymous reference? As each apple is counted, both parties understand the 
numeral to refer to its apple by, as previously discussed, being a constant, not by being a 
variable. If the numerals were being used as bound variables: apple-1, apple-2, ... then 
the customer and shopkeeper would be alike agreeing about the non-existence of any 
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apple-6, in accordance with the quantificational definition (1). But clearly, no such 
agreement takes place, since no such ‘apple-6’ is ever mentioned by either party. So the 
linguistic practice expressed by this enumeration cannot adequately be described in 
Fregean notation.   
 
However, even if the process of enumeration lacks a connection with the notation of 
Fregean logic, it does have an intimate connection with the ‘logical’ notation of data in a 
file. For, suppose the shopkeeper keeps a record of his stock of apples by means of the 
above file GGRGR. Every time he receives an apple its colour and the fact of its 
existence are recorded by adding ‘R’ or ’G’ to the file, and every time he sells an apple 
an ‘R’ or ‘G’ is deleted appropriately. If his stock is currently given by the above file 
GGRGR then, without inspecting the apples themselves, he is able to logically infer from 
this set of propositions that he has insufficient apples to meet the order ‘five red apples’. 
Instead of opening the drawer, the shopkeeper can perform upon the symbols ‘R’ in the 
list, exactly the procedure with cardinal numbers that Wittgenstein describes for the 
apples themselves, ie he can count them
22
.  
 
We see that if the list of elementary propositions is a file, ie constitutes an assertoric 
world-model, then counting may be considered a form of logical inference from those 
propositions. From his file he can deduce the proposition ‘There are fewer than five red 
apples’. This would not be the case if the elementary propositions were presented as a set 
                                                          
22
 A computerised system for a supermarket works in essentially the same way, updating an electronically 
accessible stock file in response to goods scanned at the checkout. Thus, as well as their metaphysical 
significance for the foundations of Logic, systems of files are used to formalise much of our modern 
everyday knowledge. 
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of axioms even if the apples were individually named, since classical logic always allows 
for the possible existence of unnamed red apples. Nevertheless, there is an interaction 
between the linguistic and non-linguistic notations, with Fregean formulae such as 
(x)G(x) being derivable as truth-functions from the data in the above file. While neither 
notation is fully translatable into the other, the linguistic and non-linguistic formats are 
complementary, as exhibited by a database and its query language. 
 
A reason for this interaction is that, for a finite domain, instead of defining existence only 
by the use of an existential quantifier, we are now assuming that to be, is to be recorded 
in a file, and to be destroyed is to be deleted from a file, where by a file, we mean a list of 
occupied cells referring to all the objects in the domain, ie a list of elementary 
propositions exhibiting domain-closure.  In this sense an empty file containing no records 
would be a representation of the metaphysical idea of nothing existing. [PI §55]. 
Similarly, an occupied file means everything that exists, and a single record means a 
unique something that exists different from the other somethings (records) that exist. 
Finally, the metaphysical idea of a bare particular, an object with no properties, would be 
expressed anonymously by a tally-mark, ie an empty record within a file.  
 
It is all of this that enables quantified formulae of classical logic to be inferred from files, 
an equivalence between tabulation and language universally presupposed by the 
implementation of database systems. Moreover, properties of the world as a whole, held 
by the early Wittgenstein to be inexpressible as propositions, are now seen to be 
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properties of the filing system itself, independent of the data. These tabular properties 
yield a new logic for the propositions of any closed world. 
 
One part of this non-classical logic is that a proposition is expressed by a cell only if it is 
occupied and so, as with quantifiers, a predicate is still required for the data to assert an 
existential proposition. It is just that here it is the subject that is unsaturated, instead of 
the predicate
23
.  
 
 
 
 
7.   Deducing Arithmetic 
The foregoing logical analysis of enumeration can now help improve the expression of 
Arithmetic as Logic. By regarding a file as a new kind of propositional sign, then the 
defining of number by logic (T4.1272) reconsidered by Wittgenstein in 1932 as seeming 
unnatural, can now be undertaken in a more natural way. Take GGG as a simplest 
possible world-description, and suppose it fully describes a world W of three green 
apples a, b, c respectively. Firstly, we derive Wittgenstein’s earlier definition of ‘three 
green apples’ from this file. We can easily see by assigning a to x1, b to x2, c to x3, that 
in this case, Wittgenstein’s first clause 
(2)--------              (x1,x2,x3) (G(x1) & G(x2) & G(x3) )      
is true in W. Next, since language also allows for the existence of unmentioned green 
apples, such a possibility had to be eliminated by Wittgenstein’s second clause. This 
                                                          
23
 A simple tally of dots is not an affirmation of existence, since it is not an affirmation at all. Recall that we 
considered a tally of dots or strokes to be qualitatively different from propositions, viz: a simple list of 
objects. Similarly for a tally of empty records in a file. 
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clause was effectively needed to convert the ordinary linguistic reference of x1, x2, x3 
into one-one correspondence.  
 
However in the case of files, GGG itself (unlike formula (2)) is able, because of domain 
closure, to say there is no d in W, additional to a, b, and c. Hence there is no Tarski 
assignment of a to x1, b to x2, c to x3 and d to x4, such that 
(3)----------   G(x1) & G(x2) & G(x3) & G(x4)  is true in W at [a,b,c,d] 
Consequently, Wittgenstein’s second clause,  
(4)----------   (~x1,x2,x3,x4)(G(x1) & G(x2) & G(x3) & G(x4) ) 
also follows from GGG. And from (2), (4),  (E3x)G(x) follows by his (1932) definition 
(1). In this way, we see that (E3x)G(x) can be inferred from the (anonymous) elementary 
propositions GGG and not just from quantified clauses.  
 
Thus, both the clauses (2), (4) follow logically from the one-one correspondence 
(implying domain-closure) used by GGG, as a mode of reference. Finally, this proof of 
(E3x)G(x)  from GGG now justifies a rule for inferring (E||| x)G(x) directly from
24
 the 
file GGG, viz: by counting. In doing this we simply employ the fact that the unary digits 
of the numeral correspond one-one with those cells of the file which contain the predicate 
G. By thus proving that the linguistic complexity of (1) is equivalent to humble counting 
in a file, we avoid the tortuous route of having to infer the existence of triples (2) and the 
nonexistence of quadruples (4).  
 
                                                          
24
 This is the unary notation used by Wittgenstein in 1932 (Ibid) 
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An argument therefore, in favour of GGG now being considered a logical form, is surely 
that by matching it with unary digits we are now able to deduce number from logic in a 
natural way, as required by Wittgenstein in 1932. This not only formalizes Wittgenstein’s 
later example of a shopkeeper, but is effectively the form of numerical inference used by 
modern databases
25
 when counting the entities in a file. The unnaturalness of the earlier 
Wittgenstein’s second clause (4) was due to the absence of domain-closure in classical 
logic, and the resulting attempt to define one-one correspondence in terms purely of 
linguistic reference by variables. For, even when Wittgenstein makes these variables one-
one by special decree [1932], the first clause (2) cannot alone guarantee that it refers to 
everything in the domain. 
 
8.   More Typical Files 
Finally, if we take our original anonymous file  GGRGR and eliminate the anonymity by 
adding symbols to identify the objects referred to by the cells, we obtain a table, thus 
a b d c e 
G G R G R 
 
Here the surrounding box sets a boundary to the universe of discourse (The ‘World’), 
subdivided into cells, which are now rendered visible once again. Strictly, we must now 
say that an object is referred to, not by a cell, but by a pair of cells, a column, containing 
two kinds of data-value: a predicate, and a singular term. Each column is called a record, 
the record of a particular object. Thus what started out just as a simple tally-mark has 
                                                          
25
 They do not infer quantity by separately inferring clauses (2), (4) from the data. While this is of course 
theoretically possible, it is computationally inefficient. 
 31 
gradually become elaborated into a record in a file. Furthermore, by adding more rows to 
the table we permit ourselves to record more predicates for each object. 
 
The above table expresses not only all the propositions listed in the set S:  G(a), R(d), … 
including ~R(a), ~G(d),… but also generalisations such as x(G(x) v R(x))  and 
numerical statements like E3xG(x). Thus the table expresses strictly more content than 
the Fregean formulae G(a), R(d), …and their negations, and so does more than merely 
express Fregean logical form. Rather it provides a new kind of logical form for 
elementary propositions, satisfying Tractatus 4.26, and founded on tabulation instead of 
language. If propositions are what we know or believe, then examples such as the family 
tree, the class-register and the shopkeeper show that often the facts that we believe about 
the world are seen as a bounded whole or system. This means they are best expressed by 
data, ie better formalised by occupied cells of a file than by sentences of a formal 
language. For even our simplest knowledge of any world can include universal and 
numerical propositions about it.  
 
The foregoing analysis of elementary propositions as non-linguistic data has of course 
been confined only to the simplest of files. However, the versatility and pervasiveness of 
databases suggests that it can be extended to all human knowledge of closed systems. 
Unlike the elementary formulae of the Frege/Russell formalism, the data contained in a 
file meet the exact requirements of our informal knowledge for any closed world, 
including the requirements of modern information-processing. What has been shown here 
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is that such a file of data is capable of entailing, at least for a finite domain and monadic 
predicates, everything that is the case, ie The World. 
 
 
 
